Q: What is the main argument of the paper regarding institutional rentals in Israel?
A: The paper argues that government policies promoting institutional rentals are an expensive and inefficient solution, causing more harm than good due to loss of revenue, market distortions, and inefficient redistribution of resources.

Q: How does the paper describe the current rental market in Israel?
A: The rental market in Israel is described as typified by perfect competition and decentralization, with most apartments privately owned and rented out based on contractual agreements between landlords and tenants.

Q: What are the main costs associated with government-promoted institutional rentals?
A: The main costs include loss of revenue from land sales and tax exemptions, as well as the costs associated with regulating contractual relationships between managing bodies and tenants, which are higher than the benefits generated.

Q: Why does the paper argue that rent control is harmful?
A: Rent control is considered harmful because it artificially keeps rents below their free-market equilibrium price, leading to distortions, weakening economic efficiency, and creating a black market.

Q: What does the paper say about the incentives given to entrepreneurs for building rental properties?
A: The paper states that the incentives provided by the State to entrepreneurs for building rental properties are excessively generous and make the industry economically unfeasible without them. Construction for sale is more profitable.

Q: How does the paper compare the costs and benefits of institutional rentals?
A: The paper concludes that the public cost of introducing institutional elements into the rental market is extraordinarily higher than the benefit to a small group of tenants, with the benefit being only 19%-26% of the public cost.

Q: What is the issue with the lottery system used to allocate subsidized rentals?
A: The lottery system is criticized for being random and not based on socioeconomic factors, leading to unequal distribution of benefits and potentially widening disparities.

Q: What does the paper suggest about the transparency of the decision-making process for promoting institutional rentals?
A: The paper argues that the decision-making process for promoting institutional rentals has not been transparent, circumventing budgeting and leading to a sacrifice of revenue that is not explicitly recorded in the State budget.

Q: What is the paper's recommendation for improving the housing market?
A: The paper suggests that increasing the supply of housing is the best and most challenging solution, and that the government should stop making things worse by implementing inefficient policies.

Q: What is the main conclusion of the paper regarding government intervention in the rental market?
A: The paper concludes that government programs and bodies charged with housing affairs do not solve problems but instead create unnecessary uncertainty and shocks in the market, leading to inefficient redistribution of resources.